Treason In Wartime: Once Top Secret DoS Documents

URL's For State Department Documents Part 6 (In Reverse Order)

----- Original Message -----
From: Goldencoast Publishing
To:
Cc: john mccarthy
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2003 3:47 PM
Subject: FW: Part 6 - First Mention of use of Khmer Serei - December 1967- After Cherry Disbanded

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From: Goldencoast Publishing
Date: Sun, 15 Oct 2000 02:12:07 -0700
To: Christy Clark
Subject: Part 6 - First Mention of use of Khmer Serei - December 1967 - After Cherry Disbanded

We now know when policy shifts - The following is when - and John is in jail awaiting trial - unknownst to the policy makers - The rest of the history speaks for itself - the CIA rogue becomes the US policy in 1970.
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URL to documents #216 - #223

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/
vol_xxvii/x.html

219. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/

Washington, December 12, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E(1)a, 5/66-1/68, Cambodia. Top Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT
What to do about Cambodia
You asked for an alternative to a military "solution" to the Communist use of Cambodian soil.

1. Close the Mekong River to Cambodian-bound traffic. (Before the end of the day I should have a study from the Agency on the effects of this. Frankly, I do not expect its economic impact would be anything like crippling. But it would have a good psychological effect both here and there.)

2. Vigorous pursuit of the preclusive buying of Cambodian food supplies available to enemy. We do not know how effective such a program could be. At least, however, we ought to be able to complicate and make more expensive communist use of Cambodia as a supply source.

3. Make use of the anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei elements in South Vietnam and Thailand. There are dangers in this but they are dwarfed by the disadvantages of overt military action against Cambodia. If a rejuvenated Khmer Serei does nothing else, it might convince Sihanouk and others in the Cambodian Government that their own interests lie in trying to minimize Cambodia's availability to the Communists as a sanctuary.

4. Mount a black operation to create in Phnom Penh Rangoon-type riots and demonstrations (ostensibly the work of the Chinese community). Sihanouk has already proved his extreme sensitivity to Chinese misconduct. We would not have to create much of a "Chinese disturbance" to send him up the wall again with all that this would imply for a more vigorous approach by him to restrain Communist freedom of action in Cambodia.

5. A re-invigorated effort against the Communist supply line in Southern Laos. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Before we go down the road of a widened war in Cambodia, we ought to try the intensification of the one everybody knows about in Laos. (There was a technical discovery some months ago of tremendous promise for making the Ho Chi Minh trail unusable for a substantial part of the year. Its name was Operation Mud./2/ I do not know its present status, but if it lives up to its promise it would go far to reducing the Cambodian problem to manageable proportions.

/2/Operation Commando Lava, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, for documentation on this operation.

Of course, all of the above will not work. But they do not all need to work to bring or to keep the Cambodian problem down to tolerable levels. They would serve also to alert domestic and world opinion to this problem and give us a period in which people could be prepared for sterner action should it become necessary.

Although I know you are aware of my views on this, I feel bound to repeat that I believe American public reaction to military action against Cambodia would be God-awful. I cannot believe that the military significance of the enemy's use of Cambodia is so great that it justifies taking a step so destructive of American public support of the war in Vietnam. In time, the American public could be prepared for what will certainly be viewed as a widened war. But it has not been prepared yet.

Marshall
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NOTE - This is the only reference I see to use of Khmer Serei - It is not responded to and the subject is never broached again - Note - by this time John is in prison -

The next is State Department Abbreviations and Code names - I only went to the D's to show before and after - Note - Daniel Boone is there - Cherry is Not
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State Department Abbreviations and Code names:

A/A	anti-aircraft
AA	African-Asian
ACM	Air Chief Marshal
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (U.S. Army)
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFP	Agence France Press
AID	Agency for International Development
ANZAC	Australia, New Zealand Army Corps
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
ARD	Accelerated Rural Development
ARDP	Accelerated Rural Development Program
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASPAC	Asian and Pacific Council
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
Barrel Roll	code name for interdiction and close air support operations in Laos
C-135	four engine, turbot propeller, long-range transport aircraft
CAS	Controlled American Source (MY NOTE - IN LAOS CAS also stands for Combined area studies - CIA Code Name)
CBI	China, Burma, India
CD	civil defense
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CH-34	cargo helicopter
CHICOMS	Chinese Communists
CHJUSMAG	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CI	Counterinsurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/ONE	Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP	Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress
CIDG	Citizens' Irregular Defense Group
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander in Crhief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONUS	continental United States
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
C/S	Chief of staff
CSOC	Counter Insurgency Operations Command
CST	Central Standard Time
CT	Communist terrorists; Chinese teams; Country Team
CTZ	combat zone
DA	Department of the Army
Daniel Boone	codename for cross border intelligence operations in northeast Cambodia
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DDO/EA	Deputy Directorate of Operations, East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
Depcirtel	Department of State circular telegram
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV or DRVN	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTG	date/time/group

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RE: Cherry: I will next quote from the Secret Transcript of CID interrogation concerning Cherry, and it's relation to Khmer Serei - and their mission - Will fax copy separate to you
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"Does the Kemer Serai (sp) think you're Special Forces --- If so, why?"
A - Kemer Serai, sir, thinks some of the people involved in Cherry ... they know .. are Special Forces..." ...
Q - "What position did he (Inchin Lam my note) hold in the Kemer Serai?"
A - "He's the third-ranking person in the Kemer Serai. He is well known. If the Kemer Serai wants the Americans to back Cambodia, which they thought... he believed ... will happen, the Kemer Serai goes in, overthrows the government, and removes the Prime Minister."
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Here are some writings about the Khmer Serei found at URL

http://www.alternatives.com/library/pol/polintel/c20.txt

According to Frank Snepp, the CIA's principal political analyst in Vietnam at this time, in early 1970 the Agency was cultivating both Lon Nol and Son Ngoc Thanh, leader of the Khmer Serei, as possible replacements for Sihanouk. The CIA believed, he says, that if Lon Nol came to power, "He would welcome the United States with open arms and we would accomplish everything." (This, presumably, meant carte blanche to wipe out Vietnamese Communist forces and sanctuaries in Cambodia, as opposed to Sihanouk's extremely equivocal position on the matter.) Both men, as matters turned out, served as prime minister in the new government, for which diplomatic recognition was immediately forthcoming from Washington.
The United States could seemingly also rely on Sirik Matak, a committed anti-Communist who had been profiled by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency as "a friend of the West and ... co-operative with U.S. officials during the 1950s."
Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, in his biographic work on Kissinger, states that Sihanouk's immediate overthrow had been for years a high priority of the Green Berets reconnaissance units operating inside Cambodia since the late 1960s. There is also incontrovertible evidence that Lon Nol was approached by agents of American military intelligence in 1969 and asked to overthrow the Sihanouk government. Sihanouk made similar charges in his 1973 memoir, My War With The CIA, but they were not taken seriously then....
The CIA's intimate links to the conspiratorial circle are exemplified by an Agency report prepared six days before the coup, entitled "Indications of Possible Coup in Phnom Penh". It disclosed that anti-Communist demonstrations against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese embassies in the capital the previous day had been planned by Sirik Matak and Lon Nol as part of a showdown policy against Sihanouk and his followers, and that the two men had put the army on alert "to prepare ... for a coup against Sihanouk if Sihanouk refused to support" them.
General William Rosson, deputy to General Creighton Abrams, the Commander of US Forces in Vietnam at the time, has declared that American commanders were informed several days beforehand that a coup was being planned and that United States support was solicited.
Roger Morris, who was serving under Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council staff when the coup took place, reported that "It was clear in the White House that the CIA station in Phnom Penh knew the plotters well, probably knew their plans, and did nothing to alert Sihanouk. They informed Washington well in advance of the coup."

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The following is a background to the Khmer Serei - Sihanouk Problem - Son Ngoc Thanh was part of the group that Cherry worked with - and provided the evidence of the KGB connections of Inchin Lam - also provided John with plate of gold when Inchin Lam died - Note in above - 1970 was listed by Snepp as when CIA and Khmer Serei were listed as being connected - Docs we have show 1967 and earlier - despite the prohibition of connection between USA and Khmer Serei
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
95/03/06 Foreign Relations, 1961-63, Vol XXIII, Southeast Asia
Office of the Historian

Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State

March 6, 1995 ............

Sihanouk believed the most serious dangers to Cambodia's survival came from Thailand and South Vietnam, rather than from Communist China, the Soviet Union, or even North Vietnam.

With the memory of recent plots against him hatched by Cambodian opponents in Thailand and by members of the South Vietnam Government, Sihanouk constantly suspected that his enemies in Bangkok and Saigon were planning his overthrow or his assassination. Because both Thailand and South Vietnam were firmly allied with the United States, Sihanouk believed that those states acted with the full knowledge, support, and approval of their patron. There was little the United States could do to disabuse Sihanouk of this view. (77)

Fear of his immediate neighbors spurred Sihanouk in mid- 1962 to seek an international agreement guaranteeing Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity. Sihanouk threatened that Cambodia would accept Chinese and Soviet protection should his plan not be accepted. (89, 90)

The United States balked at granting guarantees on the grounds that they would seriously impact U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia, require American military advisers to withdraw from the country, and negatively affect U.S. relations with both Thailand and South Vietnam. (94, 98) Finding little support from the major Western powers, Sihanouk eventually shelved the issue in mid-1963. (107)

The question of guarantees would have been unnecessary if Cambodia and its neighbors had been able to settle their differences diplomatically. Cambodia broke relations with Thailand in 1960 and was on the verge of doing the same with South Vietnam by mid-1962.

Allegations of border violations and support for opposition groups and similar issues poisoned regional relations and eventually U.S.-Cambodian relations as well. (95, 100) Regional rivalries were so prevalent that the President's Military Representative, General Maxwell Taylor, concluded in September 1962 that Sihanouk's "morbid fear" of Thailand and South Vietnam had "created a situation of tension and emotionalism which might blow up at any time." (93)

In late 1963, the blow-up occurred. Sihanouk became increasingly agitated by the presence of Cambodian dissidents in Thailand and South Vietnam. By autumn, the issue absorbed him and he fixated on the dissident Khmer Serei, or Free Cambodians, created by his old enemy Son Ngoc Thanh. The Khmer Serei began broadcasting anti-Sihanouk messages into Cambodia from a transmitter thought to be in South Vietnam. Sihanouk publicly and vehemently condemned the group and their broadcasts. Although the Khmer Serei was small in number (about 400) and had no appreciable support within Cambodia, Sihanouk expended an inordinate amount of energy agitating against the group and its radio broadcasts. Sihanouk also raised allegations about U.S. complicity with the group. (108, 109)

Already upset by the Khmer Serei radio broadcasts, Sihanouk was further shaken by the coup in South Vietnam and the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in Saigon on November 1, 1963. Believing that the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency were behind the coup, Sihanouk saw himself as the next target. His agitation was compounded by the effects of a rigid dietary regimen he had recently begun. The combination made him emotionally overwrought and prone to impulsive, irrational behavior. (108)
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Found at this source:

The Library of Congress -> Federal Research Division -> Country Studies -> Cambodia -> Appendix B.: Major Political and Military Organizations

URL:
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cambodia/kh_appnb.html

Khmer Serei (Free Khmer)
An anti-Sihanouk group under Son Ngoc Thanh's leadership emanating from the anti-French resistance movement called the Khmer Issarak (q.v.), located in southeastern Cambodia; in armed opposition to the Sihanouk regime from 1959 on, but dissolved itself shortly after the deposition of Sihanouk in March 1970. Right wing, antimonarchical nationalists.
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The history of one Khmer Serei who joined organizations in 1964 with Beret ties is found at
http://www.khmerucaa.org/book1.htm

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larryjodaniel@excite.com