Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Christian Archibald Herter, 2 March 1959. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1085. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1085.cfm

Go to the original site:

The following documents show irrefutable proof of treason in wartime on the part of the CIA, State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC and others present. The blatant defiance of Presidential Directives issued during wartime caused untold grief and disaster for countless lives, undermined the foreign policy of the United States and caused a sitting President to decide and announce that he would not seek nor accept his parties nomination for a second term as President of The United States. These documents have been ignored by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Attorney General for the past four plus years. The Bush Administration is in receipt by fax of this information at Karl Roves White House Office

(The link gives access to the documents #168 - #179 in full)

Look for document #171 below

171. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, December 29, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S. Top Secret.

Dear Dean:

In light of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) findings (USIB Study, D-24.7/4 of 28 Oct 65, subject: Infiltration and Logistics--South Vietnam),/2/ the Joint Chief's of Staff have expressed their views for future U.S. policy and actions to cope with support being given the Viet Cong through Cambodia. Their report to me, JCSM 812-65 of 12 Nov 65,/3/ was made available to Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy on 16 November 1965 to enable prompt consideration by State and Defense staffs of the proposed courses of action which are briefly stated as follows:

====================

Courses of Action E and F.

I do not propose a policy decision at this time for conducting paramilitary operations and low level aerial reconnaissance into Cambodia, but believe we should plan to be ready for such operations. As indicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these are effective methods of supplementing other intelligence means. For example, the initial experience with Shining Brass/7/ reconnaissance/intelligence teams suggests that the selective introduction of highly trained military personnel in cross-border operations could be effective in obtaining reliable information on infiltration activity leading to more effective harassment and interdiction of supply routes.

/7/Shining Brass was the code name for U.S.-led South Vietnamese intelligence probes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos panhandle. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVIII, for extensive documentation on it and its successor operations.

Since it is only prudent to be prepared for launching cross-border and/or low level aerial reconnaissance, I have informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if the problem with Cambodia grows, consideration will be given on a case-by-case basis to undertaking such actions.

=================================
THE NEXT DOCUMENT #172 INTRODUCES THE KHMER SEREI - WHICH YOU NOW KNOW AS THE GROUP THE CIA WAS WORKING WITH IN CHERRY - The bold areas are from me and are not in the original as bolded - I just want to point out a chain here
=================================

172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand/1/

Washington, December 29, 1965, 9:36 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 THAI. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Trueheart, cleared by Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 1831.

1085. For Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Martin from the Secretary. Ref: A. Deptel 1026 to Bangkok; 1708 to Saigon./2/ B. FTB 9478./3/

/2/In telegram 1026 to Bangkok, also sent to Saigon as 1708, December 27, the Department expressed concern about Thai and South Vietnamese support for the Khmer Serei. (Ibid., POL 23-8 CAMB)

/3/Not further identified.

1. I am most concerned that, notwithstanding approaches which have been made to GVN and RTG, Vietnamese and Thai authorities continue to provide active support to Khmer Serei action against Cambodia and that a major acceleration of this activity is now imminent.

2. Ambassador Martin should see Prime Minister soonest (and General Praphat as well, if he considers this desirable)/4/ to inform him that we have incontrovertible evidence of activity of Thai officials described above and to request that he take immediate action to terminate any form of RTG support for Khmer Serei. He should use such arguments as he believes best designed to bring about this result but Thanom should be left in no doubt that it is the firm view of the United States Government that Khmer Serei operation will in no way contribute to our broad objectives in Southeast Asia and can only bring discredit on the United States as well as Thailand and South Viet Nam./5/

/4/According to telegram 1275 from Bangkok, December 30, on the basis of Department telegram 1026 and prior to receipt of telegram 1085, Martin saw Praphat and expressed concern over Thai support of the Khmer Serei. Praphat downplayed Thailand's role and claimed it was mostly "passive supporting South Vietnamese initiated and financed operations." (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 THAI)

/5/In telegram 1088 to Bangkok, December 30, Rusk asked Martin also to see Thanom so as to leave no possibility of doubt in Thai minds about the seriousness of U.S. concern in the matter and to make the record completely clear. Rusk stated that he realized "that the Vietnamese are at least equally to blame in this affair and no effort should be spared to bring them to terminate support for the Khmer Serei." (Ibid.)

3. Ambassador Lodge should follow up earlier approach and take similar line with Ky, but in view Saigon's 2166/6/ this may be deferred until approach to Thanom has been confirmed.

/6/In telegram 2166 from Saigon, December 28, Lodge reported on representations he made with Ky about South Vietnamese support for the Khmer Serei. (Ibid.)

4. Following these approaches, I would appreciate your views as to what further action, if any, is required to bring a stop to this affair./7/

/7/Lodge reported in telegram 2338 from Saigon, December 31, that should he raise the issue again with Ky, the Vietnamese Prime Minister would ask for a clear view of the U.S. position in Viet Cong use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. Lodge stated that he had "gone as far as I can go on the basis of treating the Khmer Serei as a totally isolated and separate event." (Ibid.)

Rusk

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The next comes in document 175 with highlighted material - we are now in early 1966
=================================

175. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 5, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65-9/67. Secret.

SUBJECT
Cambodia Conference

Although I understand that State as a whole remains very leery of resurrecting any Cambodia conference proposal, Allen Whiting/2/ suggests that we over here might want to consider such a move.

/2/The Director of the Office on Research and Analysis for the Far East, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

The circumstances have altered considerably since Sihanouk's turn-down of the previous conference proposal. Cambodia is more gravely threatened than ever before--by a pincer movement with MACV on Cambodia's eastern frontier and the Thai/GVN-supported Khmer Serei on the western frontier. Sihanouk is properly scared. It would be far less likely for him to shoot down the proposal under the present circumstances.

Our interests here are two-fold and clear: first and more narrowly, to get the Thai and GVN to call off their dogs--an effort in which we have been so far markedly unsuccessful; but second and more important, to get the right people to a conference where the long-sought corridor conversations can finally take place.

In short, there is more reason than ever for a Cambodia conference, both in terms of the heightened threat to Cambodia's security and in terms of our intensified quest for negotiations.

So why not add this item to our current push? (Get the British and Soviets to take the initiative summoning such a conference.)

Jim

=================================
The next is still early 1966 - Evidence is mounting that VC are using Cambodia - yet they still say no to use of Khmer Serei

=================================

176. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, January 17, 1966.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Top Secret. Drafted by Ewing and John M. Kane of SEA on January 12.

Dear Bob:

I have given careful consideration to the problem of Viet Cong use of Cambodia to support its forces in South Vietnam and, in particular, the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on future U.S. actions regarding Cambodia outlined in your letter of December 29./2/ I agree with your conclusion that, unless there is a sudden and significant increase in the use of Cambodian territory by the PAVN/Viet Cong or in logistical support obtained in Cambodia, a gradual and cautious response by the U.S. Government and by certain other friendly governments is appropriate and desirable.

/2/Document 171.

The following are my thoughts on the Courses of Action proposed by the Joint Chiefs and commented upon in your letter:

Course of Action A--The need to expand and intensify the overall intelligence collection program for Cambodia is amply demonstrated by the paucity of hard evidence on the extent and significance of PAVN/Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory and by the differences in interpretation of available information within the intelligence community which have arisen in the course of interagency discussions of the Joint Chiefs' proposals. I concur in and am forwarding your letter of December 29 to Admiral Raborn,/3/ requesting that he ask USIB to re-examine all possible assets to determine additional programs which might be developed to enhance our intelligence capability. I note, however, that among the activities which the Joint Chiefs envisage as being included in a stepped-up intelligence collection program are covert ground cross border intelligence incursions by small teams into Cambodian territory. In any proposal for this type of activity, I would wish to make certain that full consideration is given to the political problems it may raise, particularly should there be any question of the use of Vietnamese or "Khmer Serei" Cambodians.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 171.

Courses of Action B and C--I recognize the importance of political and psychological pressure on the Cambodian Government to inhibit Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory, including enlisting support in this effort by other friendly governments. We have already undertaken various actions to this effect, most recently in our December 21 press statement,/4/ and have had recent consultations with Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, India and France. We will continue to explore ways which can be effective in persuading Sihanouk that Cambodia's best interests lie in preventing, to the best of his ability, Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory. However, as you are no doubt aware, a principal drawback to our efforts in this respect has been the lack of convincing evidence that use of Cambodian territory, in fact, constitutes a really significant factor for PAVN/Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam or that there has been collusion by the Cambodian Government in such use as has taken place. An aspect of this problem is that the Cambodian Government does not have the capability to control its borders with South Vietnam to the extent of preventing any use at all of its territory by the Viet Cong.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 169.

Course D through Course I--I agree fully with your views on these proposed courses of action and have no further comment on them at this time.

In conclusion I should like to point out that unsatisfactory as the present situation in Cambodia is from the U.S. point of view, it would be far worse, it seems to me, if Cambodia were pushed into active belligerency against South Vietnam and against U.S. armed forces or if control authority there were to collapse into civil strife and virtual anarchy as a consequence of border incidents and pressures from such elements as the Khmer Serei movement. Should either of these conditions occur, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces would have a far greater opportunity than they now enjoy to use Cambodian territory for base areas, for refuge, for training, for supply and for infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. In our various calculations as to how to deal with our existing difficulties in Cambodia, I believe that these are dangers which we must always keep in mind.

Sincerely yours,

George W. Ball/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original.

=================================
Will cut off here and go to next part to keep these, as I said, to managable levels
larryjodaniel@excite.com

www.goldencoastpublishing.com

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

URL's For State Department Documents Part 5

----- Original Message -----
From: Goldencoast Publishing
To:
Cc: john mccarthy
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2003 3:46 PM
Subject: FW: 1967 - PART 5 - No change in policy


----------------
From: Goldencoast Publishing
Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2000 01:54:40 -0700
To: Christy Clark
Subject: 1967 - PART 5 - No change in policy

We'll begin with a debate over the increased use of Cambodia by the NVA - from JCS and SNIE assessments - NOTE - no change in policy - ie no note of use of Khmer Serei -

=================================
URL to documents #197 - #206

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/
vol_xxvii/v.html

198. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

JCSM-779-66

Washington, December 19, 1966.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, Cambodia, 1966. Top Secret.

SUBJECT
Actions to Deal with VC/NVA Use of Cambodian Territory (S)

1. (TS) Reference is made to JCSM-812-65, dated 12 November 1965,/2/ in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you of their views and recommendations concerning Cambodian support of the Viet Cong (VC). The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that forceful action be taken to stop the use of Cambodian territory by enemy forces as a logistics base and sanctuary.

/2/Document 159.

2. (TS) You concurred in actions to expand and intensify the over-all intelligence collection program in Cambodia, increased surveillance of the sea lines of communication (LOCs) between the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Cambodia, increased controls on the Mekong and Bassac waterways, and planning for the conduct of covert paramilitary operations and low-altitude aerial reconnaissance. You further stated that should these measures prove ineffective other recommendations would be considered on a case-by-case basis. The immediate pursuit of VC/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces withdrawing into Cambodian territory was authorized only in emergency self defense/preservation situations.

3. (TS) Measures recommended for the conduct of an aggressive political/psychological campaign to persuade the Cambodian Government to stop support of the VC/NVA were referred to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State advised a gradual and cautious approach and, with respect to covert cross-border operations, full consideration of the political problems involved. He further stated that there was a lack of convincing evidence of the significant use of Cambodian territory by the VC/NVA.

4. (TS) The VC/NVA exploitation of the pseudo-neutrality of Cambodia has increased to serious proportions. This is amply substantiated by a recent DIA assessment (Appendix A)/3/ and attested to by the conclusions reached at a Southeast Asia Coordination (SEACOORD) meeting of 10 November 1966. VC/NVA use of the Cambodian sanctuary constitutes a clear and present danger and thereby requires a continuous commitment of sizable friendly forces to the border area, impedes progress of the land campaign, and results in unnecessary US and friendly casualties. Major US operations conducted adjacent to the Cambodian border during 1966, including the largest ground operation to date, Attelboro, have provided continuing indications that the VC/NVA are using Cambodia as a base of operations, a safe haven, and a source of logistical support.

/3/Appendices A and B are attached, but not printed.

5. (TS) Actions authorized under current policy have proven inadequate to counter the growing threat imposed by VC/NVA use of Cambodia. An impasse exists wherein the collection of convincing intelligence is prerequisite to changes in policy, while adequate intelligence cannot be obtained until this policy is changed. COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and Embassy Saigon recommend and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that additional measures must be taken to obtain adequate and convincing intelligence suitable for use in diplomatic efforts aimed at reversing Cambodia's countenance of the present situation.

6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that current national policy with respect to Cambodia must again by reviewed in light of over-all US objectives in Southeast Asia and the continued use of the Cambodian sanctuary by the VC/NVA. It is noted that Secretary Vance has requested the Under Secretary of State to establish a joint State-Defense-CIA study group to explore problems associated with Cambodia. This will take time. In the meantime, certain minimum actions should be taken now. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The over-all intelligence collection program against Cambodia be expanded and intensified immediately to include:

(1) Authorization for ground reconnaissance operations such as Daniel Boone into Cambodia.

(2) Authorization to conduct high altitude U-2 photography over Cambodia on a continuing basis.

(3) Authorization to conduct medium and low altitude day/night photography, ARDF, IR, and SLAR on a continuing basis into Cambodia to a depth of 75 nautical miles from the border with Laos and South Vietnam (SVN). Excluded from reconnaissance coverage is an area 25 nautical miles around Phnom Penh.

b. Immediate pursuit of actively engaged VC/NVA forces which are withdrawing into Cambodian territory be authorized, thereby enhancing our capability to destroy the enemy, gaining hard intelligence, and increasing the security of the border area.

c. A more extensive coordinated public affairs and information program and supporting psychological operations be instituted to illuminate Cambodian support to the VC/NVA, to dissuade Cambodia from continuing such support, and to lay the foundation for possible future courses of action.

d. A memorandum, substantially as contained in Appendix B, together with a copy of Appendix A, be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/4/

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
==================================
NOTE - In the Next One - CIA says MACV overstates the problem - all the while CHERRY is in operation
==================================
200. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denny) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, SNIE 57-67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limited Distribution.

SUBJECT
SNIE 57-67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort/2/

/2/Document 199.
The attached Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the nature and the extent of Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory in support of Communist military operations in South Vietnam. The estimate was requested by the SEACOORD ambassadors, following their meeting in Saigon last November. Drawing on a MACV intelligence study, "The Role of Cambodia in the NVN/VC War Effort,"/3/ which was prepared a month previously and served as the basis of their briefing by General Westmoreland's intelligence officers, the SEACOORD ambassadors concluded that Communist use of Cambodia "is growing in magnitude" and cited MACV's view that our "tolerance level" of refusing to expand the fighting into Cambodia "is being reached." Finally, SEACOORD proposed, pending "confirmation of the magnitude and seriousness of the problem" by the intelligence community estimate, a number of specific actions to discourage Communist use of Cambodia and to expand our intelligence assets on the problem.

/3/See Document 194.

Utilizing intelligence from all sources, as well as the MACV study of last year, the estimate deals with Communist use of Cambodia for sanctuary, infiltration, and logistical support, the extent of official Cambodian involvement, as well as the RKG's ability to counter Communist efforts through Cambodia. It also attempts to assess Communist alternatives to the use of Cambodian territory in the event that Cambodian rice were denied the insurgents.

The estimate concludes that, while Communist use of Cambodian territory has increased substantially during the past 18 months and will probably continue to do so as a result of increased requirements created both by their own military build-up and intensified military operations by allied forces, denial of Cambodian territory to the Viet Cong "would not constitute a decisive element in their ability to conduct military operations," even though it would make life more difficult for them. Regarding the RKG's ability to restrict Viet Cong use of Cambodia, the estimate concludes that "Cambodia's capability to detect and resist sizable Communist forces or inhibit Communist activities, particularly in the northeast, is extremely limited." However, it notes that Sihanouk is probably aware of the general nature but not the full extent of Communist activities in Cambodia and that his own attitude has fostered a permissive atmosphere for collusion by officials and private commercial interests. The estimate also makes the judgment that Sihanouk could do more than he is now doing to discourage the Viet Cong, but because of Cambodian military limitations, fear of involvement in the war, and Sihanouk's belief that in the long run he will have to deal with the Communists, Sihanouk's efforts during 1967 to control Communist use of Cambodia "will be minor and ineffectual."

In sum, the principal judgments in this estimate are (1) that Communist use of Cambodian territory is not decisive to the Communist military effort in South Vietnam and (2) that the RKG is neither willing nor able to restrict substantially the use of its territory. On the basis of these judgments, therefore, the estimate does not appear to support the tone and implications of the MACV study. Indeed, in its own thorough review and evaluation of the MACV study, CIA has concluded that the MACV study (1) failed to discriminate sufficiently in the use of raw intelligence reports and (2) overstated the significance of Cambodia to Communist military operations in South Vietnam. We agree with CIA on these points.

Despite the estimate's divergence with MACV, it is worth noting that the DOD representatives had no major difficulties with it. Indeed, there was considerable consensus among all representatives on the high-lights of the estimate. At one point, DIA threatened to reserve its position over the amount of rice estimated to have been delivered from Cambodia to Communist forces in the central Vietnamese highlands and in the southern Laos panhandle, but later accepted compromise wording on this portion of the estimate.

Finally, the conclusion that the Viet Cong in certain areas would probably have to rely on major shipments of rice from North Vietnam if Cambodia were no longer a source is, in our judgment, somewhat overdrawn since we are not at all confident that sources within South Vietnam could not make up the gap or that rice from these sources could be effectively denied the insurgents.
==================================
OF ALL THE DOCS - the next is the only one that can save the CIA - I have no idea what it contains -
==================================
202. Memorandum From the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, April 13, 1967.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files: Job 78-000032R, Chipwood Memos, Vol. II. Secret. 2-1/2 pages of source text not declassified.]
==================================
ONE guesstimate that with the classification of Secret - It is not contradictory to the overall policy of no contac with Khmer Serei - since those dealing with that subject often go to the TOP SECET level - To supplement this view, the next document outlines expansion of Daniel Boone - with CIA involvement and note - NO ACTION TO BRING IN KHMER SEREI - John is already involved in CHERRY
==================================

205. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, May 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Unger and initialed by Kohler.

SUBJECT
Initial Report by the Joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia

1. Pursuant to a suggestion to you from Deputy Secretary Vance, agreement was reached last December on the establishment of Joint Study Group under Department of State Chairmanship to discuss means of dealing with the problem of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of Cambodia. In addition to State, representatives of the Department of Defense and CIA participated in the study and USIA was included in the discussions of psychological operations.

2. The Study Group has now completed its initial report which I am submitting to you at Tab A. In this report (pages 1-4) you will find a summary and a series of recommendations which provide the essence of our findings. It is our hope that the report will serve as a policy and operating guide for the Cambodian question as it relates to the war in Viet-Nam. The report is labeled "initial" in recognition of the need to reassess its findings regularly.

3. If you approve the report I recommend that you forward it to Messrs. Vance and Helms (see draft letter at Tab B)/2/ and invite their approval as well. Once the report is approved I would recommend also providing an information copy to Mr. Marks, USIA.

/2/Attached but not printed.

4. As the work of the Study Group proceeded we were able to reach immediate agreement on certain recommended actions and authorization was given to proceed with these forthwith as noted in the report, beginning on page 26. In addition to those actions, primarily in the military field, we have also been proceeding with diplomatic and informational activities.

5. With respect to certain other recommended actions, the Study Group deferred decision in one instance and in the remaining cases decided it was inadvisable to approve the actions under present circumstances. These deferred and disapproved proposals are discussed in the report starting on page 30. The deferred decision concerns certain limited ground reconnaissance operations, including the participation of US personnel, in a limited area of Northeast Cambodia adjacent to South Viet-Nam and Laos (code name: Daniel Boone). Because of the sensitivity of these operations I wished them to be considered at a high level in the Department but I recommend that they be approved since I consider the military utility high and the risk of exposure low.

Recommendations/3/

/3/Katzenbach approved both recommendations on May 9.

6. It is recommended that you:

a) Approve the Initial Report (Tab A) of the Study Group and sign the letters transmitting it to Defense and CIA (see Tab B).

b) Approve the Daniel Boone operation recommended by the Study Group and concur in the transmittal of the messages contained in Tab K of the Initial Report.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Attachment/4/

Initial Report of the Joint Department of State-Department of Defense-Central Intelligence Agency Study Group on Cambodia

/4/Top Secret; Limdis.

I. Summary and Recommendations

Following a SEACOORD meeting in November 1966, which focussed attention on the increasing seriousness of the problems of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodia, USIB undertook a restudy of the problem in an effort to evaluate its relative significance to our military effort in Vietnam. That study, completed on January 26, 1967, concludes inter alia that VC/NVA use of Cambodia: (1) does not constitute a decisive element in the enemy capability for conducting military operations in Vietnam; (2) is of considerable psychological and military advantage to them; and (3) is likely to increase further during the coming year./5/

/5/Special National Intelligence Estimate 57-67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 199.]

Based on the USIB study, an interdepartmental Study Group, representing State, OASD/ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA (with USIA participation on psychological operations) has been meeting since early February under Ambassador Unger's chairmanship to consider what additional actions might be taken to deal with this problem. In particular, the Study Group has examined in detail proposals submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an expansion of existing ground and aerial intelligence collection activities, psychological operations, and immediate pursuit of VC/NVA forces on Cambodian soil.

In considering the JCS proposals, the Study Group has worked from the premises that, for the present, our efforts to deal with this problem should continue to be primarily in the political sphere and should be on a priority basis. Provocative actions which would seriously prejudice the success of such efforts and threaten to expand the combat into Cambodia should be avoided. However, those actions which are clearly required in terms of self-defense of our forces in South Vietnam should continue to be authorized as necessary.

Although recognizing the limited capability of the Cambodians to control their frontiers, the Study Group noted recent developments in Cambodia which seem to offer an improved prospect for getting the Cambodian Government to take more effective action to reduce the advantage VC/NVA forces derive from use of Cambodian territory. The Study Group supported a stepped up plan of political/diplomatic action aimed at getting Cambodian cooperation or acquiescence in dealing with this problem and bringing about an improvement in US-Cambodian relations.

In view of the increased concern over VC/NVA activity in Cambodia and in order to obtain a clearer picture of the extent of such activity and its effect upon military operations in South Vietnam, measures designed to expand air intelligence collection programs and which carry tolerable political risks have been approved. An expanded leaflet operation to reach VC/NVA forces in relatively sparsely populated border areas of Cambodia has also been approved and a psychological operations plan prepared for use as authorized (Tab H). Other proposals involving actions by US forces on Cambodian territory, which would have been difficult to conceal and involved high risk of further worsening our relations with Cambodia, have been deferred pending further diplomatic efforts to reach some understanding with Cambodians which could lead to an improvement in the existing situation. These proposals are covered in detail in Section V of the report.

The recommendations of the Study Group are as follows:

(1) that the Study Group's initial report be adopted as the basis for actions concerning Cambodia taken by the respective agencies involved, in particular Section IV (Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action) and Section V

A. (Approved Actions.)

(2) that Daniel Boone-type operations in the border zone of Northeastern Cambodia be authorized on a case-by-case basis as described in Tabs K and L./6/

/6/In JCS telegram 5937 to CINCPAC, May 22, the Joint Chiefs informed CINCPAC that Daniel Boone cross-border operations for northeastern Cambodia were approved subject to certain restrictions: The area was limited; reconnaissance teams were to total not more than 12 men (with no more than 3 U.S. advisers); tactical airstrikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces into Cambodia was not approved; infiltration and exfiltration would be by foot; mission time would be kept to the minimum; all precautions should be taken to avoid contact with Cambodians; purpose of the operation was intelligence and verification; no more than three missions could be undertaken at one time; missions required prior JCS approval with notification of the Department of State; and the operations would not be acknowledged. (Department of Defense, JCS Official Records, 880/211 (22 May 67) IR 2278)6

(3) that those proposals in Section V A. that were partially implemented and those proposals in Section V B. that were deferred in their entirety, at appropriate intervals be reviewed and considered for expansion or implementation.

(4) that the Study Group meet as necessary on an ad hoc basis where new developments call for consideration of recommendations for specific actions going beyond the guidelines laid down in this report.

(5) that in any case the Study Group reconvene for a comprehensive review of the situation after a three month period.
[Here follow section II, "The Nature of the Problem," section III, "U.S. Policy, section IV, "Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action," section V, "Proposals Considered by the Study Group and Action Taken," and Tabs A-M, and Annexes I and II.]

==================================
IN SEPT - JOHN is in CHERRY STILL - Here are the proposals and decisions on additional cross border operations - Daniel Boone - and NO CHERRY - and NO AUTHORIZATION for Khmer Serei contact
==================================

This brings us to the URL for documents #207 - #215:

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/
vol_xxvii/w.html

==================================

209. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, September 14, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Top Secret. Drafted by Lacey and Perry on September 13.

SUBJECT
Cambodian Policy
Problem

Enemy use of Cambodia over the past year has continued to increase and has become a mounting source of frustration to the US commitment in Viet-Nam. Since July, the Joint State/Defense/CIA Interagency Study Group on Cambodia has considered a series of proposals aimed at alleviating the problem. The Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD), meeting in Saigon in August, drafted some recommendations which encompassed a new, tougher, overall approach to the Royal Cambodian Government (RKG). CINCPAC also has offered a program which calls for a more intensive political and military offensive, as well as a number of requests for enlarged military operations inside the Cambodian border.

The proposals prescribe actions intended to impel a more forthcoming and cooperative response from Prince Sihanouk with respect to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. They call for greater dissemination of information on enemy use of Cambodia, the initiation of a propaganda campaign, and the expansion of reconnaissance missions across the Cambodian border. Running through these proposals is the assumption that if political measures fail to resolve the problem, then more direct action might be required.

Discussion

Cambodia's relations with Communist China have cooled markedly and there are definite indications of a Cambodian crackdown on internal communist activity. Although we do not know all the whys- and-wherefores, these developments suggest that the politico-diplomatic approach to the problem is still useful. It would be unwise, however, to conclude that more political pressures upon the Prince by itself can force him to change his tune and to become more cooperative. Our leverage is still small.

And yet, the time has come when the US should pursue its political and diplomatic approaches more systematically, more actively and more extensively.

We should do what we have been doing but more aggressively. We should present by official means the evidence on which we base our deep concern--to the Cambodian Government, to the ICC, and to other selected addressees including the Geneva Co-Chairmen. For too long we have left the explanation of the border problem to the distortions of Cambodian propagandists.

Inevitably these actions will leak and will arouse some public stir, since Sihanouk can be expected to make a public rebuttal and countercharge. And the Soviets might react similarly. But if our case is presented objectively, without accusations of Cambodian complicity, Sihanouk might be persuaded to take some steps to protect his eroding claim of neutrality. He might, for example, be more helpful to the ICC investigations, or modify his catechism of complaints before the UN. In seeking to make our case, however, we should not dilute the credibility of our evidence (which is not the most convincing) by launching a propaganda campaign as suggested by SEACOORD and CINCPAC.

As for future military operations, whether reconnaissance or direct action, the pivotal consideration is the magnitude of threat to US objectives that derives from enemy use of Cambodia as sanctuary: does the problem warrant direct action that would widen the war.
After reviewing the results of intensive intelligence collection of the past six months, the sanctuary problem would not appear to have vital significance to the successful pursuit of our overall objectives. In view of our desire to avoid expanding the war, and in the light of the non-critical nature of the Cambodian sanctuary problem, no direct military action appears justifiable, either now or in the foreseeable future.

The sanctuary problem does, however, pose a threat to allied forces in the border area and we should agree to authorize the extension of cross border reconnaissance patrols. This will provide our forces with the kind of tactical intelligence needed to defend against possible attack from across the border; and it will help us to determine any significant changes in the importance of the problem. Beyond this essentially defensive step, we can live with the situation at its present level.
Recommendations/2/

/2/Katzenbach approved all recommendations on September 16.

1. On past occasions we have informed the Cambodian Government, in notes delivered by the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh of our concern over the violation of Cambodia's neutrality by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese armies. Also in notes to the Cambodian Government we have at various times expressed our willingness to support ICC investigations of this situation. We have also informed the Cambodian Government of our readiness to meet any place, any time to discuss this issue and to work out mutually acceptable ways of dealing with it. These official expressions of our concern should be continued.

2. The USIB has noted two papers prepared on VC/NVA use of Cambodia as a safehaven area for bases and infiltration. We should transmit the complete versions to Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and transmit a sanitized version to Japan, India and other selected countries. Our intent is to make clear to other governments the basis for our concern and hopefully to encourage their emissaries to express our concern to their diplomatic colleagues. To be effective this course of action will require persistent follow-through. To this end instructions should be sent to our posts in Saigon, Vientiane and Bangkok which place upon the SEACOORD Working Group the responsibility for prompt reporting of relevant and timely evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia.

3. We have tried intermittently to communicate with the Cambodian Government through third parties such as Japan and India. These efforts have not proven very fruitful and they do not look promising. Nevertheless, we should renew the efforts and instruct our ambassadors in Tokyo, New Delhi, Singapore, etc. of our wish to carry on this course of action.

4. The ICC investigations similarly have not proven useful and they will not become so unless there is a radical change in the policy of the Indian and Polish Governments. Even so it is desirable that we continue to put our version of the facts before this forum and establish that we have exhausted all possible avenues. Accordingly, this particular exercise should be continued.

5. We have not up to now, made much use of the United Nations as a forum of expressing the United States' case, believing it ill-advised to engage in a public dog-fight with Prince Sihanouk by attempting to answer his charges, before the United Nations, of US/Viet-Nam aggressions against his territory. Even so we should anticipate the day when the United States may be called upon to reply formally. Also we should anticipate the day when a White Paper might be called for. To these ends the Department of State should undertake a special effort to compile the required documentation in appropriate form.

6. Finally, I call your attention to a separate memorandum (Tab 2) regarding a proposed expansion of reconnaissance activities in Cambodia./3/ In sum, it provides that military actions across the border exclude everything except essential defensive measures presently authorized and certain additional reconnaissance missions inside Cambodia.

/3/See Document 210.

210. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/

Washington, September 14, 1967.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Top Secret. Drafted by Perry on September 13.

SUBJECT
JCS Proposal to Extend Daniel Boone Operations

Attached at Tab A is the draft authorization message for expanding Daniel Boone operations inside Cambodia geographically, numerically, and mechanically./2/ The presently authorized area is in the extreme Northeast (marked in red on map at Tabs B and C). The JCS recommend

1) an extension of the area in a 20 km swath along the border to the Gulf of Siam; 2) an increase from 10 to 30 operations per month from the Lao border to Lo Go (marked in green on map at Tab B); 3) additional operations on a case-by-case basis South of Lo Go (marked in black on map at Tab B); and 4) the use of helicopters for insertion and extraction of the reconnaissance teams.

/2/Tabs A-C are attached, but not printed.
While I agree in the need for increased reconnaissance along the Cambodian border, the attached proposal would, if accepted, almost certainly expose our operations inside Cambodia and might result in direct combat between Cambodian forces and the US-led Daniel Boone teams.

The use of helicopters multiplies the risk of detection several times. They are highly visible and audible and would attract the attention of defenders, whether Cambodian or Communist Vietnamese. They are also vulnerable to ground fire, and if shot down, would provide tangible proof of allied violation of Cambodian territory.

The risk of exposure and combat with Cambodian forces is also greatly increased by operations in the area south of Route 13. From that point, population density increases and the character of the population changes from predominantly nomadic Montagnard to predominantly Cambodian farmer, who has been told to defend his home against allied "aggressors", and who in many cases has been provided with the weapons to do so. This area also contains a greater number of

Cambodian military units.

Recommendations/3/

/3/Katzenbach approved both recommendations on September 16.
I recommend for the foregoing reasons that you approve the following guidelines for Daniel Boone:

A. Use of helicopters is excluded from Daniel Boone operations except in emergency extractions and in cases where it can be shown that their use is essential.

B. Daniel Boone operations up to a maximum of 30 a month are limited to a 20 km belt from Route 13 to the Lao border (marked in blue on Tab

C), except in those cases where an essential need for reconnaissance can be demonstrated.

211. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

I-35994/67

Washington, October 5, 1967.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 71 A 4919, Cambodia 000.1--1967 (381 Cambodia).
Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Daniel Boone

As result of recommendations by the Joint State/Defense/CIA Study Group for Cambodia, CINCPAC was authorized on 22 May 1967 to conduct limited cross-border ground reconnaissance operations into the northeast corner of Cambodia, using U.S.-South Vietnamese Special Forces teams (Daniel Boone). The specified area of operations and other conditions for the initial Daniel Boone program are shown on the map at Tab A./2/ The map at Tab B/3/ shows a sampling of Daniel Boone operations June-September 1967. It illustrates that present restrictions result in Daniel Boone operations having limited value for tactical or other intelligence purposes.

/2/Tab A was a map that delineated a 20-kilometer deep zone of operations in a small area of the extreme northeast corner of Cambodia's border with Kontum province of South Vietnam. Foot infiltration and exfiltration was allowed; helicopters could be used only for emergency exfiltration. There could only be a maximum of ten missions a month and monthly schedules had to be submitted in advance for Washington-level approval.

/3/Attached, but not printed.

Based on COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommendations, the Joint Staff representative on the Cambodia Study Group proposed expanding the area of operations to the full length of the SVN/Cambodian border and authorizing the use of helicopters to infiltrate and exfiltrate the teams. This proposal was discussed by the Study Group and eventually reduced to the modified program as shown at Tab C,/4/ which would have provided for use of helicopters for both introduction and extraction of the teams in the northern part of the area of operations. The Department of State representative non-concurred on the basis that such use would inevitably result in incidents and should be authorized by Washington on a case by case basis and only under exceptional circumstances. The length of the area was also objected to on the basis of its extending too far into areas of population density. State therefore proposed to use Route 13 as the dividing line between sub-areas. Mr. Katzenbach supported this position.

/4/Tab C was a map that proposed that the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam be divided into 2 zones. In the northern Alpha zone from the Lao border to Route 13 there could be up to 30 incursions in a 20-kilometer deep area per month with infiltration and exfiltration by helicopters. Forty-eight-hour notice would be given to Washington. In the southern Bravo zone from Route 13 along the rest of the Cambodia border, all operations had to be referred to Washington on a case-by-case basis.

An alternative proposal developed by the Joint Staff to reduce the risk and at the same time to permit needed operational flexibility is shown at Tab D./5/ It has also been rejected by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State. However, Mr. Katzenbach has not addressed this new proposal.

/5/Tab D was the "JCS/DOD minimum proposal," which covered the same two zones as in Tab C, but in Alpha zone only 5 of the 30 missions a month could use helicopters and they would be limited to infiltration of only 10 kilometers. Forty-eight hours' notice would be required. Operations in Bravo zone would be referred to Washington for approval.
In the memorandum at Tab E,/6/ the Acting Chairman, JCS, requests that you take this matter up with the Secretary of State to seek his agreement on the alternative program.

/6/CM 2666-67, September 28. Attached, but not printed.

I recommend that you endorse the concept of operations shown at Tab D and that you instruct me to take up this proposal with Mr. Katzenbach./7/

/7/McNamara wrote the following note at the end of the memorandum:
"10/6. Discuss with Nick [Katzenbach]--I lean to 'modified C' if Nick disagrees with D.R. McN."

Paul C. Warnke

==================================
The next set - John has been arrested - No mention of this - and CIA in the end of recommendations - Helms says, I'll think about it - END OF 214 highlighted - It is obvious that CIA disbands Cherry to avoid the inevitable finding out of what they are doing in light of above - It is becoming obvious that a change in policy is coming about - ie more operations and in all of this - NO MODIFICATION of no contact with Khmer Serei -
==================================

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia/1/

Washington, November 29, 1967, 0225Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 CAMB-VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared in substance with Rostow at the White House, and approved by Rusk.

76054. 1. After careful consideration here, we are today requesting GOA to transmit to Cambodian Government note and evidence set forth below concerning VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. Transmission of note would be accompanied by oral statement, as contained para 8 below, that USG would not make public this summary.

2. Intended purpose is to convey to RKG on confidential basis clear picture of massive evidence available to us on this subject. We intend to position note and material in ICC and other capitals for possible later transmission depending on developments. Septels will cover this in light of timing of actual transmission.

3. By agreement with GOA Embassy here, we and they are suggesting that transmission be via Bangkok, to avoid excessive strain on GOA communications facilities to Phnom Penh. Bangkok should therefore transfer note and supporting evidence to appropriate stationery and get in touch with GOA Embassy there to put this in their hands. GOA Embassy Bangkok will in turn be receiving appropriate instructions from Canberra.

4. Exact timing of delivery not yet finally determined. We have today discussed factors that point in our minds to going ahead soonest and have urged GOA in this direction. However, no final Canberra decision has yet been made.

5. Saigon should hold this information to itself for time being. We anticipate instructing you to inform GVN at time of final delivery. However, consistent with intended confidential basis, we believe you should consider how this can best be done to minimize danger of GVN leak. Please give us your recommendations. We would be inclined to have you go personally to Thieu and/or Do stressing that any hope for effectiveness depends in our judgment on preserving confidential basis. (FYI: We of course recognize that Sihanouk may so act as to compel future publicity, but we will cross this bridge when we get to it. End FYI.) Needless to say, this whole action should be restricted to tightest need-to-know circle, and all who are necessarily brought in should be cautioned in strongest terms against any leak.

6. Canberra should immediately convey full contents this cable at appropriate levels. GOA Embassy already has all elements of this message.

7. Following is text of note to be delivered RKG:/2/

/2/Text also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 1039-1040.

Begin text: "The United States has the honor to request the Embassy of Australia to deliver the following information to the Royal Cambodian Government.

The United States has regretted the impairment of its relations with Cambodia. Despite differences, however, the United States continues to respect the neutrality, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

A particularly distressing problem dividing the United States and Cambodia arises out of incidents in the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam border area. The United States wishes to emphasize that American forces operating in South Viet-Nam are engaged in conflict with Viet Cong-North Vietnamese forces committing aggression against South Viet-Nam. The American forces have no hostile intentions toward Cambodia or Cambodian territory. The root cause of incidents affecting Cambodian territory is the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese presence in the frontier region, and their use of Cambodian territory in violation of the neutrality of Cambodia.

The United States has offered to cooperate in seeking a solution to this problem. Following the suggestion of His Royal Highness Prince Sihanouk for more effective action by the International Control Commission, made most notably in December of 1965, the United States has consistently supported such action and has indicated its willingness to consider sympathetically any request for specific assistance to this end.

At the time, the Royal Cambodian Government suggested that the International Control Commission might undertake continuing and effective review of activities in the port of Sihanoukville, and it was further suggested that the Commission might be expanded so that it could more effectively monitor the border areas between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

In addition, the United States has supported an international conference on Cambodia, and it has also suggested direct, informal talks with Cambodian officials in order to seek an alternative remedy.

The United States is deeply concerned over the critical issue of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory and it wishes to emphasize once more its willingness to cooperate in any reasonable method of controlling this problem.

The Royal Cambodian Government may not be aware of the extent of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of its territory, and the United States therefore wishes to provide it with the attached summary of some of the evidence available. The documents and interrogations from which this evidence has been compiled are fully available if desired. Additional evidence received in more recent periods is being assessed, and may be presented to the Royal Cambodian Government at a later time.

The United States believes that the Royal Cambodian Government will share its concern over Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of neutral Cambodian territory. It is in the spirit of assisting the Royal Cambodian Government in its efforts to prevent violations of its neutral territory that this evidence is presented." [End text.]

8. Apart from transmitting the note, Deschamps will be instructed to make the following oral statement on delivery to RKG:

"The United States Government has made clear to my Government that the note and attached evidence that I am now presenting is being provided on a confidential basis to the Royal Cambodian Government. This is in keeping with the spirit of the note as stated in its last paragraph.

Inevitably, the United States Government will have to continue to respond to press questions by general statements that it has communicated with the Royal Cambodian Government over a long period on this subject. Moreover, individual reports bearing on this matter may continue to receive some publicity through circumstances often beyond the control of US authority. Nonetheless, the purpose of the United States Government in presenting the full summary of the evidence to the Royal Cambodian Government is as stated in the last paragraph of the note, and the United States Government does not intend to make public the summary of evidence attached to the note."

[Here follows evidence cited in paragraph 1 above to be presented to the Cambodian Government in conjunction with the note. The remaining portion of the cable totals 20 pages.]

Rusk

213. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

Saigon, December 5, 1967, 0815Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5E (1)a, 5/66-1/68, Cambodia. Top Secret; Limdis; Exclusive for Wheeler. Repeated to Rusk, McNamara, and Sharp. This telegram was retyped in the White House and used at a lunch-eon meeting on December 5; for a record of the meeting, see Document 214; and apparently referred to at the meeting of 6:02 p.m. of December 5, see Document 216.

MAC J00 40588. 1. (TS) Admiral Sharp and I have discussed the enemy situation in the tri-border area and he concurs that action as recommended below should be taken.

2. (TS) We are receiving increasing hard intelligence of enemy force concentrations in the Cambodian "peninsula" of the tri-border area west of Dak To. Generally, the observed NVA presence encompasses all of the Cambodian peninsula north and east of YB6200. We have firm indications that the 1st NVA Div HQ is now located at YB675110, with the 32d, 66th and 174th Regts dispersed throughout the peninsula recovering from the severe beating given them over the past few weeks.

3. (TS) Reports state that enemy units are not disposed in an alert or defensive posture; rather, they are utilizing their Cambodian sanctuary to rest, regroup and reconstitute openly and unmolested. There is no evidence of heavy bunker construction, we believe that the motorable road and bridges at YB736212 and YB736208 are of prime importance to the NVA in the movement of supplies out of Base Area 609 into South Vietnam.

4. (TS) The situation as outlined above, presents a unique opportunity for pursuit by fire. The area is remote; the border is ill-defined; there are no known civilians in the area or Cambodian presence; the delivery of fire easily concealed from scrutiny; and more significantly, the enemy's dangerous activities fulfill all the criteria for substantiating the hot pursuit concept. Strike Teams on Station will provide for observation of fire and reports of enemy locations, reaction and subsequent movement.

5. (TS) Request earliest approval to attack this concentration of enemy force by fire employing B-52 strikes for sustained period of at least 72 hours, high intensity TAC air strikes are particularly urged since exposure of this action would be minimal, and this weapons system will provide maximum surprise and shock effect. B-52 strikes only at night would be acceptable.

6. (TS) There are two aspects of this request which I recognize as sensitive. First, the timing may be considered poor because of the efforts which we are right now making to confront Sihanouk with evidence of NVA use of Cambodia. Secondly, B-52 strikes will leave a clear signature in Cambodian territory. However, I feel strongly that the opportunity which exists is sufficiently important that it should be exploited now, and if necessary explain our actions as hot pursuit by fire in an uninhabited area. The key point is to strike this concentration expeditiously and with full force if we are to gain maximum advantage.

7. (U) Amb. Bunker has read this message and concurs.

214. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, December 5, 1967, 1:18-2:37 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the living quarters of the White House. Attending were President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, McNamara, Rusk, Vance, Helms, Rostow, George Christian, and Tom Johnson.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cambodia.]
Secretary McNamara said two cables came in from General Westmoreland concerning possible campaigns in Laos and Cambodia./2/

/2/For the cable on Cambodia, see Document 213.
General Wheeler said that there are 5,000 troops and supplies in the Tri-Border area. There are three regiments and bridges which are important to the resupply of the enemy operating out of Cambodia. The first North Vietnamese division withdrew. Its headquarters is a mile from the border and 15 miles from Dakto.

General Wheeler said the enemy is not to go in. They are refitting and replenishing their manpower.

We propose the use of B-52s and tactical aircraft for 72 hours. The B-52s could operate at night.

General Wheeler said that General Westmoreland discussed this operation with Ambassador Bunker. Ambassador Bunker concurs.
General Wheeler pointed out that there is no question that all of this is in Cambodia.

"We have known for two years that these people have been there."
Secretary McNamara said this action raises very serious political problems which outweigh the military gains. Secretary Rusk said he would draw a distinction between operations in Laos and operations in Cambodia. He said he would also draw a distinction between full-scale operations and a raid.

Secretary Rusk said that if we hit the enemy in Cambodia and possibly kill Cambodian personnel, this may give them reasons to commit their forces against us.

Secretary McNamara said that the President could veto a "stop the bombing" resolution in the United Nations because of world and domestic reaction. The Secretary said the action against Cambodia would destroy us in the U.N.

In addition, the Secretary said that the U.S. cannot run B-52s around the clock without public knowledge of that.

Dick Helms said he would like to look at this before making a recommendation. Secretary Rusk asked if U.S. forces were going on with night and day raids against infiltration routes used by the regiment which is being brought into South Vietnam.

General Wheeler said yes, to the best of our ability. General Wheeler said the proposal was to use a South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade in area 607 to destroy troops and ammunition. He said it is occupied by supply centers and troops. He said the raid would take three days and would involve 1,500 to 1,600 South Vietnamese troops along with about 30 U.S. advisors.

Secretary McNamara said the Laos situation is different. He said the border is ill-defined. He said the chances of getting caught are much different.

Secretary Rusk said there is not a fraction of as much a problem in Laos as there is in Cambodia.

Secretary McNamara said he recommended going ahead with the Laos operation. Secretary Rusk agreed.

The President approved.
==================================

larryjodaniel@excite.com

www.goldencoastpublishing.com

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

• According to Frank Snepp, the CIA's principal political analyst in Vietnam at this time, in early 1970 the Agency was cultivating both Lon Nol and Son Ngoc Thanh, leader of the Khmer Serei, as possible replacements for Sihanouk. The CIA believed, he says, that if Lon Nol came to power, "He would welcome the United States with open arms and we would accomplish everything." (This, presumably, meant carte blanche to wipe out Vietnamese Communist forces and sanctuaries in Cambodia, as opposed to Sihanouk's extremely equivocal position on the matter.) Both men, as matters turned out, served as prime minister in the new government, for which diplomatic recognition was immediately forthcoming from Washington.
  
  
• The United States could seemingly also rely on Sirik Matak, a committed anti-Communist who had been profiled by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency as "a friend of the West and ... co-operative with U.S. officials during the 1950s."
  
  
• Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, in his biographic work on Kissinger, states that Sihanouk's immediate overthrow had been for years a high priority of the Green Berets reconnaissance units operating inside Cambodia since the late 1960s. There is also incontrovertible evidence that Lon Nol was approached by agents of American military intelligence in 1969 and asked to overthrow the Sihanouk government. Sihanouk made similar charges in his 1973 memoir, My War With The CIA, but they were not taken seriously then....
  
  
• The CIA's intimate links to the conspiratorial circle are exemplified by an Agency report prepared six days before the coup, entitled "Indications of Possible Coup in Phnom Penh". It disclosed that anti-Communist demonstrations against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese embassies in the capital the previous day had been planned by Sirik Matak and Lon Nol as part of a showdown policy against Sihanouk and his followers, and that the two men had put the army on alert "to prepare ... for a coup against Sihanouk if Sihanouk refused to support" them.
  
  
• General William Rosson, deputy to General Creighton Abrams, the Commander of US Forces in Vietnam at the time, has declared that American commanders were informed several days beforehand that a coup was being planned and that United States support was solicited.
  
  
• Roger Morris, who was serving under Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council staff when the coup took place, reported that "It was clear in the White House that the CIA station in Phnom Penh knew the plotters well, probably knew their plans, and did nothing to alert Sihanouk. They informed Washington well in advance of the coup."

=================================
The following is a background to the Khmer Serei - Sihanouk Problem - Son Ngoc Thanh was part of the group that Cherry worked with - and provided the evidence of the KGB connections of Inchin Lam - also provided John with plate of gold when Inchin Lam died - Note in above - 1970 was listed by Snepp as when CIA and Khmer Serei were listed as being connected - Docs we have show 1967 and earlier - despite the prohibition of connection between USA and Khmer Serei
=================================

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
95/03/06 Foreign Relations, 1961-63, Vol XXIII, Southeast Asia
Office of the Historian

Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State

March 6, 1995 ............

Sihanouk believed the most serious dangers to Cambodia's survival came from Thailand and South Vietnam, rather than from Communist China, the Soviet Union, or even North Vietnam.

With the memory of recent plots against him hatched by Cambodian opponents in Thailand and by members of the South Vietnam Government, Sihanouk constantly suspected that his enemies in Bangkok and Saigon were planning his overthrow or his assassination. Because both Thailand and South Vietnam were firmly allied with the United States, Sihanouk believed that those states acted with the full knowledge, support, and approval of their patron. There was little the United States could do to disabuse Sihanouk of this view. (77)

Fear of his immediate neighbors spurred Sihanouk in mid- 1962 to seek an international agreement guaranteeing Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity. Sihanouk threatened that Cambodia would accept Chinese and Soviet protection should his plan not be accepted. (89, 90)

The United States balked at granting guarantees on the grounds that they would seriously impact U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia, require American military advisers to withdraw from the country, and negatively affect U.S. relations with both Thailand and South Vietnam. (94, 98) Finding little support from the major Western powers, Sihanouk eventually shelved the issue in mid-1963. (107)

The question of guarantees would have been unnecessary if Cambodia and its neighbors had been able to settle their differences diplomatically. Cambodia broke relations with Thailand in 1960 and was on the verge of doing the same with South Vietnam by mid-1962.

Allegations of border violations and support for opposition groups and similar issues poisoned regional relations and eventually U.S.-Cambodian relations as well. (95, 100) Regional rivalries were so prevalent that the President's Military Representative, General Maxwell Taylor, concluded in September 1962 that Sihanouk's "morbid fear" of Thailand and South Vietnam had "created a situation of tension and emotionalism which might blow up at any time." (93)

In late 1963, the blow-up occurred. Sihanouk became increasingly agitated by the presence of Cambodian dissidents in Thailand and South Vietnam. By autumn, the issue absorbed him and he fixated on the dissident Khmer Serei, or Free Cambodians, created by his old enemy Son Ngoc Thanh. The Khmer Serei began broadcasting anti-Sihanouk messages into Cambodia from a transmitter thought to be in South Vietnam. Sihanouk publicly and vehemently condemned the group and their broadcasts. Although the Khmer Serei was small in number (about 400) and had no appreciable support within Cambodia, Sihanouk expended an inordinate amount of energy agitating against the group and its radio broadcasts. Sihanouk also raised allegations about U.S. complicity with the group. (108, 109)

Already upset by the Khmer Serei radio broadcasts, Sihanouk was further shaken by the coup in South Vietnam and the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in Saigon on November 1, 1963. Believing that the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency were behind the coup, Sihanouk saw himself as the next target. His agitation was compounded by the effects of a rigid dietary regimen he had recently begun. The combination made him emotionally overwrought and prone to impulsive, irrational behavior. (108)
=================================
Found at this source:

The Library of Congress -> Federal Research Division -> Country Studies -> Cambodia -> Appendix B.: Major Political and Military Organizations

URL:
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cambodia/kh_appnb.html

Khmer Serei (Free Khmer)
An anti-Sihanouk group under Son Ngoc Thanh's leadership emanating from the anti-French resistance movement called the Khmer Issarak (q.v.), located in southeastern Cambodia; in armed opposition to the Sihanouk regime from 1959 on, but dissolved itself shortly after the deposition of Sihanouk in March 1970. Right wing, antimonarchical nationalists.
=============================

The history of one Khmer Serei who joined organizations in 1964 with Beret ties is found at
http://www.khmerucaa.org/book1.htm

=============================

larryjodaniel@excite.com

www.goldencoastpublishing.com

See also: