The new National Intelligence Strategy of the United States:
The document’s foreword, written by Negroponte, immediately states that the Strategy is based on the "new concept
of ‘national intelligence’ codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed by Congress in 2004", its origins in the "tragedy of September 11, 2001", and President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of the United States".
In other words, the Strategy is a strengthening and solidification of the existing Homeland/National Security apparatus
into a more centralized structure (with more power and control in the hands of the Executive Branch), consolidating multiple
agencies, including the CIA. The objectives are unchanged, based on the original 9/11/ "war on terrorism" construct, and further
inspired ("codified") by the 9/11 Commission whitewash and other more recent variations on 9/11-pretext "anti-terrorism".
Brimming with Orwellian language and bureaucrat-speak, the Strategy promises a lot of the same "war on terrorism"---and
what is not the same is worse.
The Strategy’s "mission objectives" are:
- Defeat "terrorists" at home and abroad by disarming their operational capabilities and seizing the initiative from them
by promoting the growth of freedom and democracy. [note the emphasis on "at home"—LC]
- Prevent and counter the spread of WMDs.
- Bolster growth of democracy. This includes the "support of diplomatic and military efforts (including pre-and post-conflict)
where intervention is necessary".
- Develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets [the unnamed "targets" are characterized as
"tough adversaries that know a great deal about our intelligence system"—LC]
- Anticipate developments of "strategic concern".
In an analysis of the new Strategy by the Washington Post's Walter Pincus, the renewed emphasis on "bolstering democracies in foreign country" and working with/through foreign intelligence services
are new, according to two former senior intelligence officers queried by Pincus. But given the fact that "soft power" intelligence
and covert operations are as old as the "tradecraft" itself.
In the same vein, the establishment of "new and strengthened relationships with foreign intelligence services, according
to Pincus, "appears to conflict with goals recently set by CIA Director Porter Goss, who told his agency he wants to increase
unilateral human intelligence collection and reduce reliance on foreign liason relationships." The truth, in contrast to Pincus’
suggestion, is that beefed up unilateral and foreign human intelligence are not (and never have been) mutually exclusive.
What the new Strategy does suggest is that the bellicose "go-it-alone" approach of the scandal-ridden Bush administration
has become a political liability, which has forced a renewed emphasis on less overt/more subtle methods of intervention, more
reliance on foreign agencies, fronts and proxies, and better plausible deniability. This is nothing new. It is an opportunistic
return to "classic" methods.
This adjustment in style does not change or derail the "mission objectives" that have been in place since 9/11. If anything,
it heralds an even more dangerous, slicker, and more potent international police apparatus, bigger than ever, led by a master
of terrorism in Negroponte.
Elsewhere, the Strategy lays out ten goals, or "enterprise objectives", focusing on the restructuring of the national intelligence
bureaucracy. The recommendations include the steps pushed by the corrupt and fraudulent 9/11 Commission whitewash (also see this analysis). The Strategy also (in laughably self-conscience wordage) calls for "human source collection with the highest traditions
of professionalism and intellectual prowess".
If successfully executed, the elimination of inter-agency conflict could result in an international clandestine force of
unprecedented reach and depth.
One of the most pernicious aspects of the Strategy is the official sanction of something that has been in the works throughout
2005: the unleashing of the National Clandestine Service, headed by CIA Director Porter Goss.
A deepening of the national security apparatus into every corner of the nation is made explicit, under the enterprise objective
of "expanding reporting of information and intelligence value from state, local and tribal law enforcement entities and
private sector stakeholders". The United States, already a police state, will now be officially and thoroughly infested
down to the local level.
The new Intelligence Strategy is the same old clandestine machine
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States changes nothing about what matters. The National Security/Homeland
Security machine remains an abomination, deadly and criminal from the CIA’s founding in 1947 to the present.
We need only refer back to the 1972 expose of the CIA, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by (CIA veteran) Victor
Marchetti and John D. Marks. Quoting from this heavily redacted classic to remind ourselves what this apparatus is about:
"It engages in espionage and counter-espionage, in propaganda and disinformation (the deliberate circulation of false information),
in psychological warfare and paramilitary activities. It penetrates and manipulates private institutions, and creates its
own organizations (called "proprietaries") when necessary. It recruits officials to carry out its most unsavory tasks. It
does whatever is required to achieve its goals, without any consideration of the ethics involved or the moral consequences
of its actions."
"The ‘clandestine mentality’ is a mind-set that thrives on secrecy and deception. It encourages professional
amorality—the belief that righteous goals can be achieved through the use of unprincipled and normally unacceptable
"Deeply embedded within the clandestine mentality is the belief that human ethics and social laws have no bearing on covert
operations or their practitioners. The intelligence profession, because of lofty ‘national security’ goals, is
free from all moral restrictions."
"The extreme secrecy in which the CIA works increases the chances that a President will call it into action. He does not
have to justify the agency’s activities to Congress, the press, or the American people, so, barring premature disclosure
there is no institutional force within the United States to stop him from doing what he wants."
And absolute power continues to corrupt absolutely.
© Copyright Larry Chin, GlobalResearch.ca, 2005